1 |
On Fri, Oct 7, 2016 at 10:05 AM, Raymond Jennings <shentino@×××××.com> wrote: |
2 |
> My opinion is that if a developer is bad enough to keep out, its also |
3 |
> important enough to get the paperwork fixed to prove it. If they have a |
4 |
> clean case it *should* be very easy to get the paperwork right. |
5 |
|
6 |
Sure, by all means leave the bug open until the paperwork is fixed, |
7 |
but I don't think that means that the developer should be allowed back |
8 |
in if the bug isn't closed before some deadline. |
9 |
|
10 |
> |
11 |
> But its the "due process" here that proves the developer is bad to begin |
12 |
> with. If comrel screwed up and there was a mistake and the developer is |
13 |
> actually meritorious, its bad for gentoo to keep them out. |
14 |
> |
15 |
|
16 |
Sure, if all three of your preconditions are true I agree with your |
17 |
conclusion. However, if comrel screwed up and there was a mistake and |
18 |
the developer is actually still a problem, then the solution is to fix |
19 |
the mistakes, not keep them around. |
20 |
|
21 |
> |
22 |
> Also, I just realized that the "everyone votes" blocks comrel manpower from |
23 |
> scaling. |
24 |
> |
25 |
> What if each member of comrel was granted the discretion to handle |
26 |
> everything as they themselves saw fit, subject to the provision that the |
27 |
> comrel lead/comrel as a group/the council could receive appeals? |
28 |
|
29 |
I tend to agree with this, or a process where Comrel assigns a small |
30 |
group of devs to each case. The Comrel lead or maybe the entirety of |
31 |
Comrel could keep a general eye on things as a level of QA and there |
32 |
would still be Council appeals. I've heard the issue raised that the |
33 |
system where all of Comrel deals with every case also causes issues |
34 |
when some members of Comrel aren't around or don't have time to deal |
35 |
with every case. Basically it makes all of Comrel as fast as its |
36 |
slowest member. Imagine if every stablereq required every member of |
37 |
an arch team to approve it? It would be like Ago trying to swim with |
38 |
concrete shoes. |
39 |
|
40 |
Indeed, with the model where all Comrel members deciding every case |
41 |
recruiting more manpower to Comrel would actually have the ironic |
42 |
effect of lowering their productivity. The best thing you could do in |
43 |
such a model is instead boot out the slowest contributors. |
44 |
|
45 |
>> Imagine if stale stablereqs could be appealed |
46 |
>> to Council... :) |
47 |
> |
48 |
> |
49 |
> Maybe not stale stablereqs themselves. This is a volunteer project with |
50 |
> finite manpower. |
51 |
> |
52 |
> However, someone deliberately *ignoring* a stablereq when there's a large |
53 |
> need for it MIGHT be more worthy of an escalation. But merely being |
54 |
> overworked should not be an offense, and it would probably go through comrel |
55 |
> first. |
56 |
|
57 |
If you punish people for ignoring important bugs at times, then you |
58 |
just encourage people to not sign up for the job in the first place. |
59 |
If you have a single queue multiple server model (which is how most |
60 |
projects tend to work, including arch teams), then the queue only |
61 |
stalls if all the servers stall. The solution in this case isn't to |
62 |
kick out servers, but rather to encourage more to show up and deal |
63 |
with the high priority bugs (the reality is that our servers don't |
64 |
strictly work on bugs in priority order, though again I think that |
65 |
trying to change this could actually lower throughput). Even if a |
66 |
server only closes one bug per year, that still has a net positive |
67 |
impact on the queue (assuming zero overhead, which is mostly true for |
68 |
the way we work). |
69 |
|
70 |
-- |
71 |
Rich |