1 |
On Fri, Jan 6, 2017 at 7:10 AM, Andreas K. Huettel <dilfridge@g.o> wrote: |
2 |
> |
3 |
> * Developers have to (?) become members of a US-based foundation in order to |
4 |
> be able to vote for the board. |
5 |
> One side is how many (US law) legal obligations follow from membership; I'd |
6 |
> guess not many, but it should be clarified. This is probably the smaller |
7 |
> issue. |
8 |
> The other side is that we can't predict worldwide legal impact, and that it |
9 |
> may well be disadvantageous for someone in another country to officially be |
10 |
> member of a US legal body. |
11 |
> |
12 |
|
13 |
Being a "member" of the Foundation is like holding stock in a US |
14 |
corporation. It gives you partial ownership in a sense of the |
15 |
Foundation (though especially if we become 501c-whatever that |
16 |
ownership is somewhat limited), and it gives you the right to vote on |
17 |
its affairs. Since we're non-profit you don't get the benefit of |
18 |
dividends. |
19 |
|
20 |
Generally speaking under US law people who are merely shareholders in |
21 |
an organization are greatly shielded from liability. There are some |
22 |
exceptions but I don't think they'd ever apply to an organization of |
23 |
our size, maybe if we had 3 members and they were constantly colluding |
24 |
to do something illegal it would be different. In a company where you |
25 |
can own multiple shares there are also some rules that apply to people |
26 |
who own a large portion of the total ownership, but that also will |
27 |
never apply here since Foundation members are all equal. |
28 |
|
29 |
So, while I can't speak for the laws of every country out there, if |
30 |
you can legally own shares of a US stock, you can probably be a member |
31 |
of the Foundation without any concerns. Disclaimer: I am not a lawyer |
32 |
and contrary opinions are welcome. |
33 |
|
34 |
I would note that I don't think developers should be /required/ to be |
35 |
members so much as that they are able to be members on request, and |
36 |
that people who cease to be devs also cease to be Foundation members. |
37 |
That effectively makes the voting constituency the same even if in |
38 |
practice not everybody votes. If the Council/Trustees are merged then |
39 |
choosing not to be a member effectively means you're not voting at |
40 |
all, but I don't see a problem with that since devs aren't required to |
41 |
vote today. |
42 |
|
43 |
> |
44 |
> * Board members have a different legal status. |
45 |
> It may become impossible for some of our developers to be elected to the |
46 |
> Gentoo "board", since the legal position may lead to conflicts of interest |
47 |
> with real-life work. |
48 |
> [I'd have to research that, but it's not impossible that even as a civil |
49 |
> servant I'd have to get that officially approved by the "Free State of |
50 |
> Bavaria".] |
51 |
|
52 |
So, the stuff I wrote above applies to members, and not the board. |
53 |
Under US law the board of a company does have responsibility to run it |
54 |
properly. If they're really negligent they could be subject to US |
55 |
criminal law, and if they don't govern the Foundation well they could |
56 |
also be civilly liable to its members (yes, members of the Foundation |
57 |
can sue the Trustees for not doing a good enough job under US law, |
58 |
though most like the Foundation would end up paying the bills up to a |
59 |
point). To the extent that they're doing their job they're not liable |
60 |
for stuff the Foundation does, so if Gentoo ends up in some copyright |
61 |
dispute and loses it is the Foundation that would pay the bills, and |
62 |
not the Trustees. Of course, if the reason it lost was because we had |
63 |
a lousy copyright policy some members could try to sue the Trustees |
64 |
personally to get some of that money back for the Foundation (err, |
65 |
guess I should get that policy done). |
66 |
|
67 |
You didn't mention officers, but they can also have responsibilities. |
68 |
If they're really negligent they could be criminally liable, and if |
69 |
they do stuff like embezzle they could be civilly liable to the |
70 |
Foundation. While our officers aren't employees you could look at |
71 |
their responsibilities a bit like that. Of course, the fact that they |
72 |
aren't paid by the Foundation and professionals in the field would |
73 |
probably greatly aid them in their defense, since it is a bit hard for |
74 |
the board to sue a volunteer treasurer for negligence when they're the |
75 |
ones who decided not to hire a CPA. |
76 |
|
77 |
And as you point out it is common for companies to require disclosure |
78 |
of board memberships by its employees, or advance permission. Usually |
79 |
this is only an issue if there is a conflict of interest of some kind. |
80 |
If you were a manager at a company like Google there would probably be |
81 |
more concerns than if you were a manager at a company like DHL. |
82 |
|
83 |
> |
84 |
> * Anyone now running for trustees can run for council and be involved in all |
85 |
> aspects of Gentoo oversight. |
86 |
> |
87 |
> * There is only one controlling body (I guess whether we name it "board" or |
88 |
> "council" doesn't matter). |
89 |
|
90 |
I think it is worth implementing this concurrently with a full vote |
91 |
for all seats so that there is a fresh mandate. We haven't decided |
92 |
how many seats/etc there should be. It really doesn't matter if you |
93 |
see this as being the "new council" or the "new trustees" - whatever |
94 |
we call it the new board inherits the responsibilities of both, and |
95 |
anybody in either set of roles today (or somebody new entirely) could |
96 |
end up on it. |
97 |
|
98 |
I only mention this because I have seen some debate about which board |
99 |
is more fit to do this or that. If there is a fresh election it is a |
100 |
moot point because people can look at the new list of responsibilities |
101 |
and vote for whoever they think will handle it best. |
102 |
|
103 |
> |
104 |
> * The part of Gentoo where mistakes are fatal (IRS filings, corporate status, |
105 |
> trademarks, financial statements) is handled by professionals (or not relevant |
106 |
> anymore). |
107 |
> [Robin is doing a great job of handling our finances at the moment, and it's |
108 |
> good that the trustees are very active now. As in all volunteer organizations, |
109 |
> we can't take that continuously for granted though.] |
110 |
> |
111 |
> * The Gentoo "council" or "board" does not involve any legal status which can |
112 |
> make it difficult for anyone to run. |
113 |
> |
114 |
|
115 |
++ in general. As with any project at times the Foundation has had |
116 |
its ups and downs, and real-world governments don't really make |
117 |
allowances for that. |
118 |
|
119 |
If for a moment there is a lull in Foundation interest then an |
120 |
umbrella org can make sure the bills get paid and the filings get done |
121 |
and the books are always in order, and maybe that is the full extent |
122 |
of Foundation activity. If at other times there is a lot of interest |
123 |
in activity then that interest can be focused on growing the |
124 |
Foundation and doing interesting things with our money, while the |
125 |
baseline activities continue to have professional oversight. |
126 |
|
127 |
It basically frees Gentoo volunteers to focus more on things like |
128 |
organizing an annual dev conference and less on filing 990s. You |
129 |
can't do the former unless the latter is in order, and people are |
130 |
going to be a LOT more willing to sponsor stuff if we have a fairly |
131 |
solid compliance posture financially. |
132 |
|
133 |
> The end result in terms of self-administration is not that much different from |
134 |
> Matthew's proposal. The legal construct, however, is very much different. |
135 |
|
136 |
++ |
137 |
|
138 |
Either way we have a central governance. This model also extends well |
139 |
if we want to have similar legal entities in other countries (assuming |
140 |
there is some advantage to doing so). You could have a project to |
141 |
manage this stuff, and sub-projects per country. However, it is |
142 |
important to maintain one overall governing board on top of everything |
143 |
so that we don't run into conflicts. We don't want our non-profit |
144 |
that runs booths in Japan fighting with our non-profit that runs |
145 |
booths in India/etc. |
146 |
|
147 |
Again, that all depends on whether we really benefit from foreign |
148 |
incorporations. The administrative burden goes away with the umbrella |
149 |
org, but there might or might not be other benefits, and I don't think |
150 |
those are really the focus here but I think this is a model that could |
151 |
scale out well. |
152 |
|
153 |
-- |
154 |
Rich |