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I'll try to make points shorter where possible. |
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|
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On 11/10/2016 04:01 AM, Rich Freeman wrote: |
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> On Wed, Nov 9, 2016 at 9:42 PM, Daniel Campbell <zlg@g.o |
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> <mailto:zlg@g.o>> wrote: |
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>> I would vote in favor of language along these lines: |
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>> |
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>> "Gentoo developers may sit for a maximum of one (1) office between the |
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>> Community Relations, Council, and Trustees projects. Should a developer |
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>> run for and win election for more than one office, they are to choose |
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>> which office they favor, with the next runner-up assuming the office not |
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>> claimed. This restriction enables officers to focus solely on their area |
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>> of concern and prevents manipulation or abuse of power. Each project may |
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>> impose its own requirements for membership, but no developer may be |
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>> allowed membership to more than one of the prior mentioned groups." |
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>> |
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>> It's not what I think is ideal (no Comrel at all, leaving that job to |
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>> Staff), but I think it creates an environment that is more accountable |
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>> and less likely to cause further problems in the future. |
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> |
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> If there is no Comrel wouldn't that be leaving the job to Council? |
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> Surely you're not suggesting that random IRC ops should have the rights |
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> to kick random developers entirely from the project (IRC ops already do |
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> all the things you seem to want them to do). If there were no Comrel, |
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> wouldn't that be equivalent to a Comrel that had 100% overlap with |
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> Council and no appeals? |
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|
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The idea is if Comrel can't be held accountable and we're bound up in a |
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bunch of bureaucracy, and if we're suffering from manpower issues, it's |
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smarter to go lean and nix it entirely than try to revive or shape it |
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up. The actual actions taken against developers or users are already |
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handled by dedicated staff, and appeals would then, as usual, be heard |
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by Council. If nobody on Council had a hand in making the original |
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decision(s), then they're clear to judge the situation on its own merit. |
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|
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> Setting that aside, you also left out QA and Infra, which are the other |
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> two special projects. QA has most of the powers that Comrel has that |
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> people tend to get concerned with (cutting off commit access, |
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> unilaterally imposing restrictions on tree policy, with the same appeal |
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> to Council as Comrel, though it operates more openly). Infra |
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> effectively has a lot of power though it mainly serves to execute policy |
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> more than anything else. |
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|
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I hadn't considered those two, mostly because I've not seen or heard |
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of them going out of line. Overlap there should be disallowed as well, |
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as it can create a disproportionate amount of technical influence as |
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opposed to the social influence that we're discussing now. |
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|
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> Note that Council members are already not allowed to be Trustees (a |
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> policy I've publicly disagreed with a few times, somehow managing to not |
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> get kicked out for :) ). |
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> |
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> So, while I'm not entirely opposed in concept to what you're saying, it |
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> does raise a practical issue, which is why I've tended to be reluctant |
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> to embrace these suggestions when they come up. We have 7 council |
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> members and trustees. Let's say that we want 5 members of QA and Comrel |
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> (those don't have fixed numbers). You're now up to 24 people who have |
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> to hold mutually exclusive positions. That is probably 10% or more of |
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> the truly active developer population (I don't have a problem with |
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> having a long tail of devs who make small positive contributions, but |
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> they're probably not going to be staffing the Trustees). On the one |
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> hand spreading out the jobs in theory gives people more time to devote |
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> to each. In practice it tends to involve giving more roles to people |
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> who are actually less interested in doing them. At points in the past |
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> we've actually struggled to fill Trustee slots (I think we've gotten |
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> down to around 5-6 vacancies at points), and for several of the past |
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> elections they've run unopposed. |
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> |
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> So, by putting a restriction on how positions are filled, you |
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> potentially block positions from being filled by whoever is best |
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> qualified and interested in spending the time. For example, Robin has |
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> been doing excellent work for the last few months trying to get the |
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> Foundations books in order, but he's also on Infra, and fairly vital |
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> there from what I've seen. If those slots were mutually exclusive then |
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> one team or the other would be deprived of his contributions, at least |
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> in the full capacity (maybe he could serve the Foundation without being |
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> a formal Trustee, but let's be honest and consider that people who have |
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> official titles probably do tend to give it a bit more sustained effort). |
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|
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That's a good example. I think it's okay to have clearly defined roles |
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with cooperation between groups. For instance, if the trustees needs |
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some information that's stored on infra and doesn't have access, then |
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it makes sense for infra to help them out on that. If they're having |
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trouble working out the books, and someone happens to know something, I |
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see no problem there, either. But dual memberships isn't what I think is |
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healthy for Gentoo, its users, or its volunteers. It spreads our already |
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dwindling talent even further, and can prevent new blood from growing |
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into more important roles. |
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|
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> In the case of Comrel, Trustees, Infra, and Council the positions also |
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> involve access to sensitive information, such as financial data, bank |
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> accounts, root passwords, or disciplinary actions. The community is |
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> going to want to have people who are well-trusted in these roles, and |
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> the more bodies you want to put in them the harder it is to find people |
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> who are well-accepted by the community. |
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> |
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> While I wouldn't want the entire show run by 1-3 people, I don't think |
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> we're at risk of some kind of coup if we only have 10 people running the |
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> show and not 24. |
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|
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The community is right to want trustworthy people in offices, but |
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it's not safe to concentrate power into the individuals who happen to |
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have the spare time to wear multiple big hats. Separating groups can |
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be a sort of "insurance", to protect a single person from affecting |
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too much. It's a sign, to me, that roles need to be either trained or |
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trimmed down. Another thing to worry about is the bus factor of any |
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given top-level group. If we need 24 people to have fully-functioning |
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top-level projects, then maybe we should be looking into motivating more |
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people to get into these positions rather than counting on long-term |
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members to simply take up more of the slack and add to their workload. |
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In short, asking ourselves why people don't want to step up and take |
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these positions, then correcting that. |
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|
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In addition, wearing multiple hats can result in decisions or reasoning |
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that makes sense in one position, but not in the one that a given person |
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is acting in in that moment, e.g. worrying about trademark issues while |
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acting as a councilor. :P It's bound to be stressful, so why don't we |
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spread that work around? |
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|
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> Checks and balances sound nice in theory, but they tend to work by |
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> blocking any action in the absence of agreement. Maybe when you're |
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> talking about going to war or locking people up in prison that makes |
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> more sense (though, honestly I think the US has some of the strongest |
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> checks and balances of any government and in practice it is very |
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> dysfunctional, with branches of government tending to bend the rules |
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> just to get anything done, and constant stalemate). With a cooperative |
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> distro where people have the freedom to fork it if it gets out of hand, |
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> I'm not convinced that all the checks are helpful. Do we really want a |
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> Comrel that goes off and puts developers through a ton of rigor while |
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> they fear for their commit access, then kicks them out, only to have the |
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> Council immediately reverse the action because they're completely |
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> unaligned? I would think that we'd want a single consistent set of |
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> policies so that most appeals are just NOOPs because the original group |
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> did its job. |
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|
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At no point should _any_ process be effectively a NOOP. That's a clear |
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sign of corruption and/or incompetence. If appeals are to be NOOP, |
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under any circumstance, then there isn't an appeal process, period. Any |
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overseeing group _must_ be prepared to take a second look at a case, or |
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take new evidence into consideration while reassessing a decision. If |
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a person is unwilling to admit that they might have made an oversight |
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somewhere, they're not fit to be deciding the fate of other developers. |
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|
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We all mostly earned our positions as developers, and dismissing or |
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disciplining people without the willingness to understand the full |
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story devalues what it means to be part of Gentoo and, understandably, |
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may drive people away. I hope that if I were to be brought before some |
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overseeing group that they would do everything they could to understand |
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the full story, and reconsider in the event that new evidence arises. |
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|
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As I've said before though, the existence of an overseeing group is the |
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wrong idea to begin with. To my knowledge, there's no overlap of staff |
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and council, so it could work if the separation was enforced. |
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|
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> This is how QA largely operates; in theory anybody can |
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> appeal any QA decision to Council, but in practice it rarely happens |
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> because the two groups communicate well and QA tends to generally follow |
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> the policies the elected Council is setting (and they really reflect |
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> sentiment of the larger community anyway). |
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> |
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> There is another practical matter here. One of the main ways that |
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> Council members end up in roles like QA/Comrel is because of some |
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> problem in these teams, such as inactivity, or understaffing. A Council |
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> member might step in and act as an interim lead to try to bring new life |
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> into the body. Ideally they find somebody to replace them and then |
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> leave, but that doesn't always happen. At the very least doing this |
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> requires temporary dual-membership, and sometimes it has to be sustained |
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> until somebody actually steps up. |
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|
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I see the reasoning in why that would happen, but I can't shake the |
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potential for risk. Smaller groups generally have fewer formalities and |
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fewer bureaucratic processes. We're experiencing a once medium-to-large |
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sized distro losing its manpower, slowly, and the processes that worked |
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for it when it was larger may start to claw away at whats left and leave |
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people stuck with multiple hats or empty projects. |
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|
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When that happens to software, don't we treeclean it, with a last-rites |
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e-mail? People aren't software, sure, but if something is old, |
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unmaintained, and in _need_ of maintenance -- be it social group/process |
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or software -- we look at what it takes to make it better and push for |
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it to either get some attention or get rid of it. |
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|
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If I understand correctly, you're saying that some attention, even if |
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it's from someone in another pivotal role, is better than no attention |
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at all. If that's the case, I think we're aiming too low. We need to |
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ask ourselves "Is comrel good for Gentoo?" "Is it improving Gentoo in |
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any tangible or measurable way?" "What do we lose by getting rid of it?" |
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|
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Given that you indicated comrel hasn't been terribly active, and I've |
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not seen any cases where it's been necessary, I think it's prime for |
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removal. I'm open to being wrong about that, but current policy prevents |
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comrel being accountable to even simple questions like the ones I asked. |
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I hope it's understandable that some may not have faith or trust in such |
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entities and situations. Things are boiling down to "<group> is fine, |
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and do a good job; trust us, we're council." I hope I don't have to |
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explain what's wrong with that. |
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|
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> I'm not saying I'm strongly opposed to your suggestion. I just want to |
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> point out that it has its downsides and I'm not convinced that it would |
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> improve things as a result. |
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> |
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> -- |
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> Rich |
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> |
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|
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I appreciate that someone in the relevant groups is actually |
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communicating about it, even if we disagree. It shows that there's some |
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willingness to understand and maybe some sort of solution can be found |
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in common ground between us. |
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|
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-- |
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Daniel Campbell - Gentoo Developer |
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OpenPGP Key: 0x1EA055D6 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net |
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fpr: AE03 9064 AE00 053C 270C 1DE4 6F7A 9091 1EA0 55D6 |