Gentoo Archives: gentoo-project

From: Daniel Campbell <zlg@g.o>
To: gentoo-project@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-project] Representation of Gentoo on third-party platforms
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2016 06:18:10
Message-Id: 001784c6-de44-ae1d-5295-c8b2cc459939@gentoo.org
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-project] Representation of Gentoo on third-party platforms by Rich Freeman
1 I'll try to make points shorter where possible.
2
3 On 11/10/2016 04:01 AM, Rich Freeman wrote:
4 > On Wed, Nov 9, 2016 at 9:42 PM, Daniel Campbell <zlg@g.o
5 > <mailto:zlg@g.o>> wrote:
6 >> I would vote in favor of language along these lines:
7 >>
8 >> "Gentoo developers may sit for a maximum of one (1) office between the
9 >> Community Relations, Council, and Trustees projects. Should a developer
10 >> run for and win election for more than one office, they are to choose
11 >> which office they favor, with the next runner-up assuming the office not
12 >> claimed. This restriction enables officers to focus solely on their area
13 >> of concern and prevents manipulation or abuse of power. Each project may
14 >> impose its own requirements for membership, but no developer may be
15 >> allowed membership to more than one of the prior mentioned groups."
16 >>
17 >> It's not what I think is ideal (no Comrel at all, leaving that job to
18 >> Staff), but I think it creates an environment that is more accountable
19 >> and less likely to cause further problems in the future.
20 >
21 > If there is no Comrel wouldn't that be leaving the job to Council?
22 > Surely you're not suggesting that random IRC ops should have the rights
23 > to kick random developers entirely from the project (IRC ops already do
24 > all the things you seem to want them to do). If there were no Comrel,
25 > wouldn't that be equivalent to a Comrel that had 100% overlap with
26 > Council and no appeals?
27
28 The idea is if Comrel can't be held accountable and we're bound up in a
29 bunch of bureaucracy, and if we're suffering from manpower issues, it's
30 smarter to go lean and nix it entirely than try to revive or shape it
31 up. The actual actions taken against developers or users are already
32 handled by dedicated staff, and appeals would then, as usual, be heard
33 by Council. If nobody on Council had a hand in making the original
34 decision(s), then they're clear to judge the situation on its own merit.
35
36 > Setting that aside, you also left out QA and Infra, which are the other
37 > two special projects. QA has most of the powers that Comrel has that
38 > people tend to get concerned with (cutting off commit access,
39 > unilaterally imposing restrictions on tree policy, with the same appeal
40 > to Council as Comrel, though it operates more openly). Infra
41 > effectively has a lot of power though it mainly serves to execute policy
42 > more than anything else.
43
44 I hadn't considered those two, mostly because I've not seen or heard
45 of them going out of line. Overlap there should be disallowed as well,
46 as it can create a disproportionate amount of technical influence as
47 opposed to the social influence that we're discussing now.
48
49 > Note that Council members are already not allowed to be Trustees (a
50 > policy I've publicly disagreed with a few times, somehow managing to not
51 > get kicked out for :) ).
52 >
53 > So, while I'm not entirely opposed in concept to what you're saying, it
54 > does raise a practical issue, which is why I've tended to be reluctant
55 > to embrace these suggestions when they come up. We have 7 council
56 > members and trustees. Let's say that we want 5 members of QA and Comrel
57 > (those don't have fixed numbers). You're now up to 24 people who have
58 > to hold mutually exclusive positions. That is probably 10% or more of
59 > the truly active developer population (I don't have a problem with
60 > having a long tail of devs who make small positive contributions, but
61 > they're probably not going to be staffing the Trustees). On the one
62 > hand spreading out the jobs in theory gives people more time to devote
63 > to each. In practice it tends to involve giving more roles to people
64 > who are actually less interested in doing them. At points in the past
65 > we've actually struggled to fill Trustee slots (I think we've gotten
66 > down to around 5-6 vacancies at points), and for several of the past
67 > elections they've run unopposed.
68 >
69 > So, by putting a restriction on how positions are filled, you
70 > potentially block positions from being filled by whoever is best
71 > qualified and interested in spending the time. For example, Robin has
72 > been doing excellent work for the last few months trying to get the
73 > Foundations books in order, but he's also on Infra, and fairly vital
74 > there from what I've seen. If those slots were mutually exclusive then
75 > one team or the other would be deprived of his contributions, at least
76 > in the full capacity (maybe he could serve the Foundation without being
77 > a formal Trustee, but let's be honest and consider that people who have
78 > official titles probably do tend to give it a bit more sustained effort).
79
80 That's a good example. I think it's okay to have clearly defined roles
81 with cooperation between groups. For instance, if the trustees needs
82 some information that's stored on infra and doesn't have access, then
83 it makes sense for infra to help them out on that. If they're having
84 trouble working out the books, and someone happens to know something, I
85 see no problem there, either. But dual memberships isn't what I think is
86 healthy for Gentoo, its users, or its volunteers. It spreads our already
87 dwindling talent even further, and can prevent new blood from growing
88 into more important roles.
89
90 > In the case of Comrel, Trustees, Infra, and Council the positions also
91 > involve access to sensitive information, such as financial data, bank
92 > accounts, root passwords, or disciplinary actions. The community is
93 > going to want to have people who are well-trusted in these roles, and
94 > the more bodies you want to put in them the harder it is to find people
95 > who are well-accepted by the community.
96 >
97 > While I wouldn't want the entire show run by 1-3 people, I don't think
98 > we're at risk of some kind of coup if we only have 10 people running the
99 > show and not 24.
100
101 The community is right to want trustworthy people in offices, but
102 it's not safe to concentrate power into the individuals who happen to
103 have the spare time to wear multiple big hats. Separating groups can
104 be a sort of "insurance", to protect a single person from affecting
105 too much. It's a sign, to me, that roles need to be either trained or
106 trimmed down. Another thing to worry about is the bus factor of any
107 given top-level group. If we need 24 people to have fully-functioning
108 top-level projects, then maybe we should be looking into motivating more
109 people to get into these positions rather than counting on long-term
110 members to simply take up more of the slack and add to their workload.
111 In short, asking ourselves why people don't want to step up and take
112 these positions, then correcting that.
113
114 In addition, wearing multiple hats can result in decisions or reasoning
115 that makes sense in one position, but not in the one that a given person
116 is acting in in that moment, e.g. worrying about trademark issues while
117 acting as a councilor. :P It's bound to be stressful, so why don't we
118 spread that work around?
119
120 > Checks and balances sound nice in theory, but they tend to work by
121 > blocking any action in the absence of agreement. Maybe when you're
122 > talking about going to war or locking people up in prison that makes
123 > more sense (though, honestly I think the US has some of the strongest
124 > checks and balances of any government and in practice it is very
125 > dysfunctional, with branches of government tending to bend the rules
126 > just to get anything done, and constant stalemate). With a cooperative
127 > distro where people have the freedom to fork it if it gets out of hand,
128 > I'm not convinced that all the checks are helpful. Do we really want a
129 > Comrel that goes off and puts developers through a ton of rigor while
130 > they fear for their commit access, then kicks them out, only to have the
131 > Council immediately reverse the action because they're completely
132 > unaligned? I would think that we'd want a single consistent set of
133 > policies so that most appeals are just NOOPs because the original group
134 > did its job.
135
136 At no point should _any_ process be effectively a NOOP. That's a clear
137 sign of corruption and/or incompetence. If appeals are to be NOOP,
138 under any circumstance, then there isn't an appeal process, period. Any
139 overseeing group _must_ be prepared to take a second look at a case, or
140 take new evidence into consideration while reassessing a decision. If
141 a person is unwilling to admit that they might have made an oversight
142 somewhere, they're not fit to be deciding the fate of other developers.
143
144 We all mostly earned our positions as developers, and dismissing or
145 disciplining people without the willingness to understand the full
146 story devalues what it means to be part of Gentoo and, understandably,
147 may drive people away. I hope that if I were to be brought before some
148 overseeing group that they would do everything they could to understand
149 the full story, and reconsider in the event that new evidence arises.
150
151 As I've said before though, the existence of an overseeing group is the
152 wrong idea to begin with. To my knowledge, there's no overlap of staff
153 and council, so it could work if the separation was enforced.
154
155 > This is how QA largely operates; in theory anybody can
156 > appeal any QA decision to Council, but in practice it rarely happens
157 > because the two groups communicate well and QA tends to generally follow
158 > the policies the elected Council is setting (and they really reflect
159 > sentiment of the larger community anyway).
160 >
161 > There is another practical matter here. One of the main ways that
162 > Council members end up in roles like QA/Comrel is because of some
163 > problem in these teams, such as inactivity, or understaffing. A Council
164 > member might step in and act as an interim lead to try to bring new life
165 > into the body. Ideally they find somebody to replace them and then
166 > leave, but that doesn't always happen. At the very least doing this
167 > requires temporary dual-membership, and sometimes it has to be sustained
168 > until somebody actually steps up.
169
170 I see the reasoning in why that would happen, but I can't shake the
171 potential for risk. Smaller groups generally have fewer formalities and
172 fewer bureaucratic processes. We're experiencing a once medium-to-large
173 sized distro losing its manpower, slowly, and the processes that worked
174 for it when it was larger may start to claw away at whats left and leave
175 people stuck with multiple hats or empty projects.
176
177 When that happens to software, don't we treeclean it, with a last-rites
178 e-mail? People aren't software, sure, but if something is old,
179 unmaintained, and in _need_ of maintenance -- be it social group/process
180 or software -- we look at what it takes to make it better and push for
181 it to either get some attention or get rid of it.
182
183 If I understand correctly, you're saying that some attention, even if
184 it's from someone in another pivotal role, is better than no attention
185 at all. If that's the case, I think we're aiming too low. We need to
186 ask ourselves "Is comrel good for Gentoo?" "Is it improving Gentoo in
187 any tangible or measurable way?" "What do we lose by getting rid of it?"
188
189 Given that you indicated comrel hasn't been terribly active, and I've
190 not seen any cases where it's been necessary, I think it's prime for
191 removal. I'm open to being wrong about that, but current policy prevents
192 comrel being accountable to even simple questions like the ones I asked.
193 I hope it's understandable that some may not have faith or trust in such
194 entities and situations. Things are boiling down to "<group> is fine,
195 and do a good job; trust us, we're council." I hope I don't have to
196 explain what's wrong with that.
197
198 > I'm not saying I'm strongly opposed to your suggestion. I just want to
199 > point out that it has its downsides and I'm not convinced that it would
200 > improve things as a result.
201 >
202 > --
203 > Rich
204 >
205
206 I appreciate that someone in the relevant groups is actually
207 communicating about it, even if we disagree. It shows that there's some
208 willingness to understand and maybe some sort of solution can be found
209 in common ground between us.
210
211 --
212 Daniel Campbell - Gentoo Developer
213 OpenPGP Key: 0x1EA055D6 @ hkp://keys.gnupg.net
214 fpr: AE03 9064 AE00 053C 270C 1DE4 6F7A 9091 1EA0 55D6

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