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On Wed, Nov 9, 2016 at 9:42 PM, Daniel Campbell <zlg@g.o> wrote: |
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> I would vote in favor of language along these lines: |
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> |
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> "Gentoo developers may sit for a maximum of one (1) office between the |
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> Community Relations, Council, and Trustees projects. Should a developer |
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> run for and win election for more than one office, they are to choose |
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> which office they favor, with the next runner-up assuming the office not |
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> claimed. This restriction enables officers to focus solely on their area |
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> of concern and prevents manipulation or abuse of power. Each project may |
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> impose its own requirements for membership, but no developer may be |
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> allowed membership to more than one of the prior mentioned groups." |
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> |
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> It's not what I think is ideal (no Comrel at all, leaving that job to |
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> Staff), but I think it creates an environment that is more accountable |
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> and less likely to cause further problems in the future. |
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|
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If there is no Comrel wouldn't that be leaving the job to Council? Surely |
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you're not suggesting that random IRC ops should have the rights to kick |
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random developers entirely from the project (IRC ops already do all the |
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things you seem to want them to do). If there were no Comrel, wouldn't |
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that be equivalent to a Comrel that had 100% overlap with Council and no |
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appeals? |
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|
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Setting that aside, you also left out QA and Infra, which are the other two |
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special projects. QA has most of the powers that Comrel has that people |
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tend to get concerned with (cutting off commit access, unilaterally |
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imposing restrictions on tree policy, with the same appeal to Council as |
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Comrel, though it operates more openly). Infra effectively has a lot of |
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power though it mainly serves to execute policy more than anything else. |
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|
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Note that Council members are already not allowed to be Trustees (a policy |
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I've publicly disagreed with a few times, somehow managing to not get |
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kicked out for :) ). |
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|
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So, while I'm not entirely opposed in concept to what you're saying, it |
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does raise a practical issue, which is why I've tended to be reluctant to |
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embrace these suggestions when they come up. We have 7 council members and |
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trustees. Let's say that we want 5 members of QA and Comrel (those don't |
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have fixed numbers). You're now up to 24 people who have to hold mutually |
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exclusive positions. That is probably 10% or more of the truly active |
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developer population (I don't have a problem with having a long tail of |
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devs who make small positive contributions, but they're probably not going |
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to be staffing the Trustees). On the one hand spreading out the jobs in |
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theory gives people more time to devote to each. In practice it tends to |
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involve giving more roles to people who are actually less interested in |
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doing them. At points in the past we've actually struggled to fill Trustee |
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slots (I think we've gotten down to around 5-6 vacancies at points), and |
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for several of the past elections they've run unopposed. |
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|
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So, by putting a restriction on how positions are filled, you potentially |
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block positions from being filled by whoever is best qualified and |
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interested in spending the time. For example, Robin has been doing |
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excellent work for the last few months trying to get the Foundations books |
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in order, but he's also on Infra, and fairly vital there from what I've |
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seen. If those slots were mutually exclusive then one team or the other |
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would be deprived of his contributions, at least in the full capacity |
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(maybe he could serve the Foundation without being a formal Trustee, but |
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let's be honest and consider that people who have official titles probably |
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do tend to give it a bit more sustained effort). |
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|
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In the case of Comrel, Trustees, Infra, and Council the positions also |
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involve access to sensitive information, such as financial data, bank |
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accounts, root passwords, or disciplinary actions. The community is going |
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to want to have people who are well-trusted in these roles, and the more |
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bodies you want to put in them the harder it is to find people who are |
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well-accepted by the community. |
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|
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While I wouldn't want the entire show run by 1-3 people, I don't think |
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we're at risk of some kind of coup if we only have 10 people running the |
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show and not 24. |
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|
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Checks and balances sound nice in theory, but they tend to work by blocking |
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any action in the absence of agreement. Maybe when you're talking about |
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going to war or locking people up in prison that makes more sense (though, |
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honestly I think the US has some of the strongest checks and balances of |
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any government and in practice it is very dysfunctional, with branches of |
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government tending to bend the rules just to get anything done, and |
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constant stalemate). With a cooperative distro where people have the |
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freedom to fork it if it gets out of hand, I'm not convinced that all the |
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checks are helpful. Do we really want a Comrel that goes off and puts |
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developers through a ton of rigor while they fear for their commit access, |
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then kicks them out, only to have the Council immediately reverse the |
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action because they're completely unaligned? I would think that we'd want |
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a single consistent set of policies so that most appeals are just NOOPs |
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because the original group did its job. This is how QA largely operates; |
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in theory anybody can appeal any QA decision to Council, but in practice it |
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rarely happens because the two groups communicate well and QA tends to |
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generally follow the policies the elected Council is setting (and they |
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really reflect sentiment of the larger community anyway). |
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|
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There is another practical matter here. One of the main ways that Council |
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members end up in roles like QA/Comrel is because of some problem in these |
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teams, such as inactivity, or understaffing. A Council member might step |
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in and act as an interim lead to try to bring new life into the body. |
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Ideally they find somebody to replace them and then leave, but that doesn't |
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always happen. At the very least doing this requires temporary |
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dual-membership, and sometimes it has to be sustained until somebody |
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actually steps up. |
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I'm not saying I'm strongly opposed to your suggestion. I just want to |
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point out that it has its downsides and I'm not convinced that it would |
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improve things as a result. |
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|
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-- |
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Rich |