1 |
On 01/11/2017 08:46 AM, Michał Górny wrote: |
2 |
> Hi, all. |
3 |
> |
4 |
> Since this is getting quite exhaustive, here's my point on the proposal |
5 |
> as it is hinted now, and a counter-proposal. |
6 |
> |
7 |
> TL;DR: |
8 |
> |
9 |
> 1. I do not mind encouraging more developers to join the Foundation, or |
10 |
> even making it opt-out. However, I do oppose discriminating developers |
11 |
> who decide not to join the Foundation. |
12 |
> |
13 |
|
14 |
How is it discriminating? As you said below, another option is to have |
15 |
the unified voting pool but vote for two bodies. However, in order to |
16 |
avoid repeating splitting the vote I think that opting out of voting for |
17 |
one should opt you out of voting for all. |
18 |
|
19 |
> 2. I agree on having a single pool of voters. However, I believe those |
20 |
> should be limited to active Gentoo developers, independently of |
21 |
> Foundation membership. |
22 |
> |
23 |
|
24 |
I think this has been more or less agreed upon. |
25 |
|
26 |
> 3. I don't think merging the Council and Trustees is a good idea. |
27 |
> The two projects have divergent goals and different qualities expected |
28 |
> from members. |
29 |
> |
30 |
|
31 |
I mostly agree, but more in the way that Trustees should oversee the |
32 |
distro as a whole, but delegate technical matters to the Council, who |
33 |
are better equipped to deal with them. Non-technical matters would boil |
34 |
up to the Trustees. |
35 |
|
36 |
> Long rationale below. |
37 |
> |
38 |
> |
39 |
> Foundation membership |
40 |
> ===================== |
41 |
> |
42 |
> First of all, I'd like to point out how I see the 'problem' of many |
43 |
> developers not being part of the Foundation. I think that in most |
44 |
> cases, it's just a matter of 'simplicity': why would I bother joining |
45 |
> Gentoo Foundation if it does not affect my Gentoo work? |
46 |
> |
47 |
> I think that many Gentoo developers, especially foreigners, have |
48 |
> serious doubts about implications of being a Foundation member. Even if |
49 |
> elaborate US lawyers can claim otherwise, we're talking about local law |
50 |
> here, and for example I had enough of the law without having to wonder |
51 |
> about the implications of formal foreign non-profit corporation |
52 |
> membership. |
53 |
> |
54 |
> So if anyone thinks that developers not being Foundation members are |
55 |
> a problem, then I think it's best solved by spreading more information |
56 |
> about the Foundation and encouragement, not attempting to force people |
57 |
> in. |
58 |
> |
59 |
> If you believe that it is legally safe for any foreigner to be |
60 |
> a Foundation member, then I think it'd be reasonable for recruiters (or |
61 |
> mentors) to propose that to new developers, and support their effort in |
62 |
> joining. |
63 |
> |
64 |
> However, I oppose making it obligatory or giving special privileges to |
65 |
> Foundation members. As long as there is no lawful reason to require |
66 |
> anyone to be a Foundation member to do X, I don't think we should |
67 |
> enforce that. And unless I'm mistaken, not even Trustees are legally |
68 |
> required to be members of the Foundation (modulo current Bylaws): |
69 |
> |
70 |
> | Directors need not be residents of New Mexico or members of |
71 |
> | the corporation unless the articles of incorporation or the bylaws |
72 |
> | so require. |
73 |
> |
74 |
> http://www.sos.state.nm.us/uploads/files/Corporations/ch53Art8.pdf |
75 |
> |
76 |
|
77 |
Ya, I think it's legally safe for foreigners to be members of the |
78 |
foundation. So please, join. |
79 |
|
80 |
> |
81 |
> Single pool of voters |
82 |
> ===================== |
83 |
> |
84 |
> I agree that having two disjoint pools of voters for two important |
85 |
> boards running Gentoo might be bad. However, following the point made |
86 |
> above I don't think that Foundation membership should be relevant to |
87 |
> the ability to vote. |
88 |
> |
89 |
> Therefore, I think it would be best if both the Council and Trustees |
90 |
> were elected by active Gentoo developers, in a manner consistent with |
91 |
> how Council is elected nowadays. |
92 |
> |
93 |
> This removes the current Foundation members who are not developers from |
94 |
> the voter pool. I'm sorry but I believe it's more appropriate that |
95 |
> people who actively develop Gentoo (and have proven to understand its |
96 |
> the organizational structure via passing the quizzes) get a vote |
97 |
> in deciding how Gentoo is run. |
98 |
> |
99 |
> While I believe it's important to remember the history of Gentoo |
100 |
> and acknowledge past contributions to it, I don't think that solely |
101 |
> past contributions should imply the ability to decide (however |
102 |
> indirectly) how Gentoo is run nowadays. |
103 |
> |
104 |
|
105 |
As I said above, I think this has been mostly settled. But I do think |
106 |
that opting out voting for one should opt you out of voting for all. So |
107 |
as to not split the pool again. |
108 |
|
109 |
> |
110 |
> Merged Council and Trustees |
111 |
> =========================== |
112 |
> |
113 |
> I find this one a really bad idea. I believe that both of these boards |
114 |
> have different goals and therefore require different qualities from |
115 |
> people forming them. |
116 |
> |
117 |
> As I see it, Trustees focus on legal and financial matters, |
118 |
> and therefore it is important that they have good knowledge of laws |
119 |
> applying to the Foundation and/or accounting. It is likely beneficial |
120 |
> for a Trustee to be a resident of the USA, and (as has been pointed |
121 |
> out) probably not everyone is legally entitled to be one. |
122 |
> |
123 |
> Council, on the other hand, focuses on technical (and quasi-social) |
124 |
> matters. It's important for Council members to be capable of good |
125 |
> judgment both on technical and community matters, and being able to |
126 |
> provide resolutions that are beneficial to the community. The location |
127 |
> is pretty much irrelevant here, and the role could be considered |
128 |
> informal by many. |
129 |
> |
130 |
> Now, merging the two institutions would create a board that has a wider |
131 |
> range of responsibilities, and require all of these qualities together. |
132 |
> I'm not convinced this will work for us. |
133 |
> |
134 |
> In particular, I see the following potential problems: |
135 |
> |
136 |
> 1. Some developers will reject nominations to the Board because of |
137 |
> legal implications (either inability to be formally a director, or just |
138 |
> lack of qualities needed for a Trustee) even though they would |
139 |
> otherwise be elected Council members. You can find these developers in |
140 |
> the current Council. |
141 |
> |
142 |
> 2. The board will have to have members competent in law and/or |
143 |
> accounting. It is possible that those members will lack the skills |
144 |
> necessary for Council, yet they would have the same vote on |
145 |
> Council-relevant matters. |
146 |
> |
147 |
> 3. In a pathological case, the voting could result in the board having |
148 |
> no members competent in Trustee business (i.e. purely Council-like |
149 |
> board). What will happen then? |
150 |
> |
151 |
> I don't think those issues could be solved without splitting the board |
152 |
> further. And once we start splitting it, we get back to where we are |
153 |
> now, so why are we changing anything? |
154 |
> |
155 |
|
156 |
This isn't combining their functions into one body, I'll go into it more |
157 |
in the next updated proposal, but the technical leadership role of |
158 |
council would still be handled by a group operating under the 'board'. |
159 |
Having that the parent group (board) and the child group (council) |
160 |
elected by the same body is fine. |
161 |
|
162 |
There is the issue of members of the board overruling on technical |
163 |
matters, but as mentioned elsewhere in the threads that can already |
164 |
happen, and should be restricted by mandate to only happen in cases |
165 |
where technical maters impact areas the board would rule over (comrel pr |
166 |
infra) |
167 |
|
168 |
> |
169 |
> Summary |
170 |
> ======= |
171 |
> |
172 |
> To be honest, I don't really know what problem is being solved here. |
173 |
> The only problem I've been able to notice so far was the possible |
174 |
> disagreement between the voter pool for the Council and Trustees which |
175 |
> I think we can merge without any drastic measures. |
176 |
> |
177 |
> However, I disagree that merging the pools would result in Council |
178 |
> and Trustees getting implicitly merged. They would still have |
179 |
> different areas of responsibility and required qualities, and therefore |
180 |
> the developers are still likely to find different people appropriate. |
181 |
> |
182 |
> That said, I don't have an opinion on disallowing a single person from |
183 |
> being on both boards. I don't think it's strictly necessary for any |
184 |
> body in Gentoo as long as the relevant person is going to respectfully |
185 |
> withdraw his vote when a potential conflict of interest arises. |
186 |
> |
187 |
> I have yet to see the final proposal to throw my vote but I already |
188 |
> start to dislike the direction it is heading towards. With no good |
189 |
> rationale, and no good problem statement it seems like a change for |
190 |
> the sake of changing things and/or replacing people. |
191 |
> |
192 |
|
193 |
|
194 |
-- |
195 |
Matthew Thode (prometheanfire) |