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Hi, all. |
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|
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Since this is getting quite exhaustive, here's my point on the proposal |
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as it is hinted now, and a counter-proposal. |
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|
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TL;DR: |
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|
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1. I do not mind encouraging more developers to join the Foundation, or |
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even making it opt-out. However, I do oppose discriminating developers |
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who decide not to join the Foundation. |
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|
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2. I agree on having a single pool of voters. However, I believe those |
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should be limited to active Gentoo developers, independently of |
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Foundation membership. |
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|
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3. I don't think merging the Council and Trustees is a good idea. |
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The two projects have divergent goals and different qualities expected |
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from members. |
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|
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Long rationale below. |
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|
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|
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Foundation membership |
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===================== |
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|
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First of all, I'd like to point out how I see the 'problem' of many |
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developers not being part of the Foundation. I think that in most |
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cases, it's just a matter of 'simplicity': why would I bother joining |
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Gentoo Foundation if it does not affect my Gentoo work? |
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|
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I think that many Gentoo developers, especially foreigners, have |
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serious doubts about implications of being a Foundation member. Even if |
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elaborate US lawyers can claim otherwise, we're talking about local law |
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here, and for example I had enough of the law without having to wonder |
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about the implications of formal foreign non-profit corporation |
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membership. |
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|
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So if anyone thinks that developers not being Foundation members are |
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a problem, then I think it's best solved by spreading more information |
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about the Foundation and encouragement, not attempting to force people |
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in. |
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|
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If you believe that it is legally safe for any foreigner to be |
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a Foundation member, then I think it'd be reasonable for recruiters (or |
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mentors) to propose that to new developers, and support their effort in |
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joining. |
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|
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However, I oppose making it obligatory or giving special privileges to |
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Foundation members. As long as there is no lawful reason to require |
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anyone to be a Foundation member to do X, I don't think we should |
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enforce that. And unless I'm mistaken, not even Trustees are legally |
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required to be members of the Foundation (modulo current Bylaws): |
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|
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| Directors need not be residents of New Mexico or members of |
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| the corporation unless the articles of incorporation or the bylaws |
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| so require. |
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|
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http://www.sos.state.nm.us/uploads/files/Corporations/ch53Art8.pdf |
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|
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|
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Single pool of voters |
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===================== |
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|
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I agree that having two disjoint pools of voters for two important |
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boards running Gentoo might be bad. However, following the point made |
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above I don't think that Foundation membership should be relevant to |
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the ability to vote. |
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|
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Therefore, I think it would be best if both the Council and Trustees |
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were elected by active Gentoo developers, in a manner consistent with |
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how Council is elected nowadays. |
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|
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This removes the current Foundation members who are not developers from |
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the voter pool. I'm sorry but I believe it's more appropriate that |
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people who actively develop Gentoo (and have proven to understand its |
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the organizational structure via passing the quizzes) get a vote |
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in deciding how Gentoo is run. |
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|
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While I believe it's important to remember the history of Gentoo |
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and acknowledge past contributions to it, I don't think that solely |
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past contributions should imply the ability to decide (however |
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indirectly) how Gentoo is run nowadays. |
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|
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|
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Merged Council and Trustees |
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=========================== |
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|
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I find this one a really bad idea. I believe that both of these boards |
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have different goals and therefore require different qualities from |
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people forming them. |
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|
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As I see it, Trustees focus on legal and financial matters, |
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and therefore it is important that they have good knowledge of laws |
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applying to the Foundation and/or accounting. It is likely beneficial |
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for a Trustee to be a resident of the USA, and (as has been pointed |
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out) probably not everyone is legally entitled to be one. |
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|
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Council, on the other hand, focuses on technical (and quasi-social) |
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matters. It's important for Council members to be capable of good |
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judgment both on technical and community matters, and being able to |
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provide resolutions that are beneficial to the community. The location |
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is pretty much irrelevant here, and the role could be considered |
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informal by many. |
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|
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Now, merging the two institutions would create a board that has a wider |
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range of responsibilities, and require all of these qualities together. |
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I'm not convinced this will work for us. |
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|
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In particular, I see the following potential problems: |
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|
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1. Some developers will reject nominations to the Board because of |
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legal implications (either inability to be formally a director, or just |
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lack of qualities needed for a Trustee) even though they would |
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otherwise be elected Council members. You can find these developers in |
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the current Council. |
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|
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2. The board will have to have members competent in law and/or |
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accounting. It is possible that those members will lack the skills |
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necessary for Council, yet they would have the same vote on |
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Council-relevant matters. |
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|
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3. In a pathological case, the voting could result in the board having |
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no members competent in Trustee business (i.e. purely Council-like |
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board). What will happen then? |
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|
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I don't think those issues could be solved without splitting the board |
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further. And once we start splitting it, we get back to where we are |
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now, so why are we changing anything? |
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|
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|
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Summary |
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======= |
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|
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To be honest, I don't really know what problem is being solved here. |
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The only problem I've been able to notice so far was the possible |
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disagreement between the voter pool for the Council and Trustees which |
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I think we can merge without any drastic measures. |
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|
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However, I disagree that merging the pools would result in Council |
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and Trustees getting implicitly merged. They would still have |
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different areas of responsibility and required qualities, and therefore |
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the developers are still likely to find different people appropriate. |
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|
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That said, I don't have an opinion on disallowing a single person from |
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being on both boards. I don't think it's strictly necessary for any |
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body in Gentoo as long as the relevant person is going to respectfully |
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withdraw his vote when a potential conflict of interest arises. |
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|
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I have yet to see the final proposal to throw my vote but I already |
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start to dislike the direction it is heading towards. With no good |
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rationale, and no good problem statement it seems like a change for |
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the sake of changing things and/or replacing people. |
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|
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-- |
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Best regards, |
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Michał Górny |
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<http://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/> |