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On Wed, 11 Jan 2017 14:01:43 -0600 |
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Matthew Thode <prometheanfire@g.o> wrote: |
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|
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> On 01/11/2017 01:40 PM, Michał Górny wrote: |
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> >> Possible Solution: |
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> >> |
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> >> Voting body: |
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> >> |
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> >> In order to solve this Gentoo needs to have a combined electorate, |
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> >> meaning those that would vote for Council would also vote for Trustees |
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> >> and visa-versa. This would ensure that everyone’s needs are represented. |
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> >> |
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> >> The combined voting body would be able to opt out of voting, however, |
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> >> opting out of voting means opting out of voting globally. The reasoning |
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> >> behind this is so that you can’t opt out of voting for one body but not |
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> >> the other, as doing so would cause a split in the voting pool. |
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> > |
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> > This doesn't answer the most important question of all: who the voting |
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> > body will be? I doubt people care about being able to opt-out of |
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> > voting. They do care, however, for being unable to vote for some |
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> > legal or otherwise external reasons. |
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> > |
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> |
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> The voting body would be active developers, meaning those that passed |
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> what used to be the staff quiz. Commit access or not. |
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|
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That sounds good to me but you'd have to get agreement on Foundation |
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end (since you're cutting their votes) and change Bylaws. But certainly |
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a direction worth considering. |
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|
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> > So, this whole thing looks really bad to me. It looks to be based on |
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> > some (accidental or intentional) misunderstanding what Council is, |
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> > combined with some degree of conflict of roles in Board (Trustees). |
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> > |
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> |
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> I see council as it is now as an overreach of what it was intended to |
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> be, or even should be. |
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|
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Are you considering evolution a problem? Things like that usually |
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happen for a reason. I don't see a reason to cut things down back to |
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where they were unless you have a good reason for that. |
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|
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> > As I said previously, the defining attributes of Trustees would be |
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> > knowledge of the law and related affairs. Why does that suddenly imply |
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> > that Trustees are required to be capable of handling project |
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> > leadership? |
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> |
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> I believe I did state that the trustees would still be limited to |
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> Legal/proj running, but this gives them the 'official' ability to reach |
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> down and change things if needed. As it is now, officially, we'd have |
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> to ask council for a change dealing with a legal issue if it started |
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> because of something technical. |
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|
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Not really. As pointed out already, Trustees have absolute power. |
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As long as they don't abuse it, I don't see a problem with Trustees |
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reaching down below whenever they find it necessary for legal reasons. |
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And I'm pretty sure Council wouldn't mind that either. |
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|
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> > Why do you insist on giving additional power to people who have |
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> > already have a well-defined purpose? Why are you forcing us to be lead |
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> > by people who offer to do legal stuff, instead of the people we trust |
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> > to lead Gentoo? |
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> |
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> I don't like the false dichotomy you offer. I personally don't see this |
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> as an overreach of power, or even a granting of power that was not |
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> already there. All this does is document things as they already are, |
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> from a more legal sense. |
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|
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No, that's not correct. You are removing the Council from between |
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Comrel, PR and Infra. |
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|
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For Comrel, this means that the Council is no longer the appeal body |
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for Comrel decisions. For Infra, this somehow makes me think Infra will |
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no longer follow the 'directions' set by Council, and instead -- for |
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some reason -- jump straight to the Board. For PR, I'm not even sure |
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what this causes. |
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|
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What I see here, is that Board suddenly gets a few more |
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responsibilities. Now, what happens if the Board makes a decision that |
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violates the CoC or the law? Do we appeal the decision to the Board |
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itself? Or do we have to sue Gentoo Foundation? |
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|
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> > Therefore, I'd like to propose an another model, which is pretty much |
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> > what we have now, possibly with some clarifications. |
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> > |
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> > For fans of fancy diagrams: |
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> > |
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> > Board/Trustees (Foundation) |
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> > | |
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> > Council |
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> > | |
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> > all other projects in Gentoo |
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> > |
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> > |
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> > As I see it, it's a pretty straightforward and clean structure. We have |
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> > two organizational bodies: Council and Board/Trustees (I don't really |
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> > see a reason to rename it). |
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> > |
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> > The duty of the Board/Trustees is to handle legal affairs. It is also |
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> > on the top of organizational structure with the power to override any |
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> > decision *if it goes against the law / CoC / etc.* In other words, it |
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> > has the highest power but must use it responsibly, and does not need to |
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> > be normally engaged in Gentoo affairs. |
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> > |
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> > The duty of the Council is to handle all affairs within Gentoo. All |
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> > projects are below Council, and Council is the final 'normal' appeal |
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> > for all decisions. Unlike some beliefs, its role is not limited to |
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> > technical matters. |
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> > |
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> > This provides a good split of responsibilities for a non-profit. On one |
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> > hand, we have a 'compliance board' (== Board/Trustees) that handles |
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> > the legal affairs but doesn't get in the way of the distribution unless |
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> > it is absolutely necessary, and we have an 'executive board' (== |
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> > Council) that handles the distribution. |
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> > |
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> > Obviously, this also meets the necessity of different qualities. Board |
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> > members/Trustees need to be fluent in the laws and/or finances. Council |
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> > members need social skills mostly, and possibly some technical skills |
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> > to be able to interact with the community. We no longer give extra |
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> > power to someone just because nobody else wants to do the legal work. |
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> > |
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> > I don't see why would anybody claim this not to be a normal or |
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> > beneficial structure. It is definitely more clear than what you're |
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> > proposing, and definitely less likely for conflicts of interest. It |
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> > provides a consistent decision appeal possibility, with a dedicated |
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> > body to handle appeals regarding CoC/law. |
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> > |
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> |
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> I see this as workable, not my preferred solution, but acceptable. I |
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> would personally rather have non-technical things and infra things |
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> outside of Council, but like I said, this can work. |
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|
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Moving things outside of Council would require another administrative |
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body to have a nice vertical structure with additional appeal body. |
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|
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Furthermore, as I pointed out, QA is there to handle the purely |
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technical affairs. Council provides a higher level of appeal |
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and decision making that combines the social and technical aspects, |
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and I think it actually focuses on the former these days. |
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|
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As I mentioned on IRC, the USE=gtk* fiasco is the best example. If you |
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attempt to solve technical problems without considering the social |
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aspect, you create policies that are not respected. To run Gentoo you |
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have to actually focus on the social aspect, and find a way to make |
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people agree with one another. |
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|
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-- |
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Best regards, |
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Michał Górny |
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<http://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/> |