Gentoo Archives: gentoo-project

From: "Michał Górny" <mgorny@g.o>
To: Matthew Thode <prometheanfire@g.o>
Cc: gentoo-project@l.g.o
Subject: Re: [gentoo-project] Formally have Foundation oversee top level projects 1.1
Date: Wed, 11 Jan 2017 20:23:01
Message-Id: 20170111212238.4ac0685f.mgorny@gentoo.org
In Reply to: Re: [gentoo-project] Formally have Foundation oversee top level projects 1.1 by Matthew Thode
1 On Wed, 11 Jan 2017 14:01:43 -0600
2 Matthew Thode <prometheanfire@g.o> wrote:
3
4 > On 01/11/2017 01:40 PM, Michał Górny wrote:
5 > >> Possible Solution:
6 > >>
7 > >> Voting body:
8 > >>
9 > >> In order to solve this Gentoo needs to have a combined electorate,
10 > >> meaning those that would vote for Council would also vote for Trustees
11 > >> and visa-versa. This would ensure that everyone’s needs are represented.
12 > >>
13 > >> The combined voting body would be able to opt out of voting, however,
14 > >> opting out of voting means opting out of voting globally. The reasoning
15 > >> behind this is so that you can’t opt out of voting for one body but not
16 > >> the other, as doing so would cause a split in the voting pool.
17 > >
18 > > This doesn't answer the most important question of all: who the voting
19 > > body will be? I doubt people care about being able to opt-out of
20 > > voting. They do care, however, for being unable to vote for some
21 > > legal or otherwise external reasons.
22 > >
23 >
24 > The voting body would be active developers, meaning those that passed
25 > what used to be the staff quiz. Commit access or not.
26
27 That sounds good to me but you'd have to get agreement on Foundation
28 end (since you're cutting their votes) and change Bylaws. But certainly
29 a direction worth considering.
30
31 > > So, this whole thing looks really bad to me. It looks to be based on
32 > > some (accidental or intentional) misunderstanding what Council is,
33 > > combined with some degree of conflict of roles in Board (Trustees).
34 > >
35 >
36 > I see council as it is now as an overreach of what it was intended to
37 > be, or even should be.
38
39 Are you considering evolution a problem? Things like that usually
40 happen for a reason. I don't see a reason to cut things down back to
41 where they were unless you have a good reason for that.
42
43 > > As I said previously, the defining attributes of Trustees would be
44 > > knowledge of the law and related affairs. Why does that suddenly imply
45 > > that Trustees are required to be capable of handling project
46 > > leadership?
47 >
48 > I believe I did state that the trustees would still be limited to
49 > Legal/proj running, but this gives them the 'official' ability to reach
50 > down and change things if needed. As it is now, officially, we'd have
51 > to ask council for a change dealing with a legal issue if it started
52 > because of something technical.
53
54 Not really. As pointed out already, Trustees have absolute power.
55 As long as they don't abuse it, I don't see a problem with Trustees
56 reaching down below whenever they find it necessary for legal reasons.
57 And I'm pretty sure Council wouldn't mind that either.
58
59 > > Why do you insist on giving additional power to people who have
60 > > already have a well-defined purpose? Why are you forcing us to be lead
61 > > by people who offer to do legal stuff, instead of the people we trust
62 > > to lead Gentoo?
63 >
64 > I don't like the false dichotomy you offer. I personally don't see this
65 > as an overreach of power, or even a granting of power that was not
66 > already there. All this does is document things as they already are,
67 > from a more legal sense.
68
69 No, that's not correct. You are removing the Council from between
70 Comrel, PR and Infra.
71
72 For Comrel, this means that the Council is no longer the appeal body
73 for Comrel decisions. For Infra, this somehow makes me think Infra will
74 no longer follow the 'directions' set by Council, and instead -- for
75 some reason -- jump straight to the Board. For PR, I'm not even sure
76 what this causes.
77
78 What I see here, is that Board suddenly gets a few more
79 responsibilities. Now, what happens if the Board makes a decision that
80 violates the CoC or the law? Do we appeal the decision to the Board
81 itself? Or do we have to sue Gentoo Foundation?
82
83 > > Therefore, I'd like to propose an another model, which is pretty much
84 > > what we have now, possibly with some clarifications.
85 > >
86 > > For fans of fancy diagrams:
87 > >
88 > > Board/Trustees (Foundation)
89 > > |
90 > > Council
91 > > |
92 > > all other projects in Gentoo
93 > >
94 > >
95 > > As I see it, it's a pretty straightforward and clean structure. We have
96 > > two organizational bodies: Council and Board/Trustees (I don't really
97 > > see a reason to rename it).
98 > >
99 > > The duty of the Board/Trustees is to handle legal affairs. It is also
100 > > on the top of organizational structure with the power to override any
101 > > decision *if it goes against the law / CoC / etc.* In other words, it
102 > > has the highest power but must use it responsibly, and does not need to
103 > > be normally engaged in Gentoo affairs.
104 > >
105 > > The duty of the Council is to handle all affairs within Gentoo. All
106 > > projects are below Council, and Council is the final 'normal' appeal
107 > > for all decisions. Unlike some beliefs, its role is not limited to
108 > > technical matters.
109 > >
110 > > This provides a good split of responsibilities for a non-profit. On one
111 > > hand, we have a 'compliance board' (== Board/Trustees) that handles
112 > > the legal affairs but doesn't get in the way of the distribution unless
113 > > it is absolutely necessary, and we have an 'executive board' (==
114 > > Council) that handles the distribution.
115 > >
116 > > Obviously, this also meets the necessity of different qualities. Board
117 > > members/Trustees need to be fluent in the laws and/or finances. Council
118 > > members need social skills mostly, and possibly some technical skills
119 > > to be able to interact with the community. We no longer give extra
120 > > power to someone just because nobody else wants to do the legal work.
121 > >
122 > > I don't see why would anybody claim this not to be a normal or
123 > > beneficial structure. It is definitely more clear than what you're
124 > > proposing, and definitely less likely for conflicts of interest. It
125 > > provides a consistent decision appeal possibility, with a dedicated
126 > > body to handle appeals regarding CoC/law.
127 > >
128 >
129 > I see this as workable, not my preferred solution, but acceptable. I
130 > would personally rather have non-technical things and infra things
131 > outside of Council, but like I said, this can work.
132
133 Moving things outside of Council would require another administrative
134 body to have a nice vertical structure with additional appeal body.
135
136 Furthermore, as I pointed out, QA is there to handle the purely
137 technical affairs. Council provides a higher level of appeal
138 and decision making that combines the social and technical aspects,
139 and I think it actually focuses on the former these days.
140
141 As I mentioned on IRC, the USE=gtk* fiasco is the best example. If you
142 attempt to solve technical problems without considering the social
143 aspect, you create policies that are not respected. To run Gentoo you
144 have to actually focus on the social aspect, and find a way to make
145 people agree with one another.
146
147 --
148 Best regards,
149 Michał Górny
150 <http://dev.gentoo.org/~mgorny/>

Replies