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On Thu, Jun 28, 2018 at 12:14 PM Michał Górny <mgorny@g.o> wrote: |
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> |
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> a. the Council decision in question is final (i.e. a general |
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> resolution can not be used to bypass the Council), |
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One question that this brings up in my mind is the duration of these |
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decisions, because Council decisions are never really final. The |
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Council can override its own decisions, or the decision of a prior |
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Council. |
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|
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Presumably you wouldn't want the current Council to be able to |
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override a GR, but how about a subsequent one? A lot of decisions are |
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made on the basis of some context that could change. |
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To use your example, suppose there is a GR to make OpenRC the default |
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service manager. Great. What happens in 10 years when it makes sense |
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to make some new service manager the default? Normally such a |
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decision wouldn't even require a Council vote, but if the previous GR |
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has no expiration, then does that mean that another GR is required to |
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make a decision that may not be as controversial in the future? |
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|
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To use a different example, consider GLEP 39. Many consider GLEP 39 |
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to be special and one that the Council cannot modify, but on the flip |
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side there is currently no real defined process for changing it. |
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(Perhaps GRs will become such a mechanism.) The result is that |
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sometimes changes that might make sense don't really get considered |
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because nobody feels empowered to make it happen. |
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|
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In any case, my point is mainly that the GR GLEP ought to indicate one |
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way or another how a GR can be modified. Presumably a GR can always |
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be used to modify a previous GR. However, do we want to relax things |
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further, such as by allowing GRs to be overriden by Council if there |
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has been a Council election in the interim? |
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|
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My last comment is more philosophical. I do support the concept |
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behind this, but I do want to note that it is a lot easier to vote for |
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something to happen than to actually make it happen. If devs |
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consistently vote for Council members who support position A, but then |
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vote via GR to impose position NOT A, it creates a bit of |
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organizational schizophrenia as there really is no executive process |
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to appeal council decisions and thus you end up tasking people to |
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execute a policy they don't actually agree with, as volunteers. The |
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likely result will be half-hearted at best, even if no outright |
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defiance takes place. So, this is a mechanism that will need to be |
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used carefully, but I think having it available as a recourse is |
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better than not having it available. |
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|
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-- |
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Rich |