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On Fri, Jul 7, 2017 at 8:25 AM, Martin Vaeth <martin@×××××.de> wrote: |
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> Peter Humphrey <peter@××××××××××××.uk> wrote: |
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>> On Friday 07 Jul 2017 07:53:01 Martin Vaeth wrote: |
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>> |
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>>> ... my original text was arguing against the claim that the primary |
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>>> purpose of hardened kernels was to protect against untrusted users |
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>>> sitting in front of the keyboard. |
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>> |
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>> It wasn't a claim, just an impression |
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> |
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> Sorry that my formulation was unfortunate. |
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> My intention had been to explain why that impression is wrong IMHO. |
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> |
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> Anyway, this discussion is meanwhile almost pointless since |
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> hardened-sources are pratically no longer available for "normal" |
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> users, and so also the hardened profile has become almost pointless. |
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> |
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https://wiki.gentoo.org/wiki/Hardened_Gentoo |
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The hardened profile still sets PaX and a slew of toolchain options. |
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> As a small substitute, I would recommend to follow the recommendations |
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> of the kernel self projection project and to use the |
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> |
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> default/linux/amd64/17.0/desktop |
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> |
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> profile or - if you are limited to x86 - to combine |
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> |
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> default/linux/x86 |
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> releases/17.0 |
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> targets/desktop |
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> |
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> which enables the current compilers with some default-enabled |
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> security relevant CFLAGS. |
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> In addition you can also add -fstack-check=specific |
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> to CFLAGS and -Wl,-z,now -Wl,-z,relro to LDFLAGS. |
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> |
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> All this is not a complete substitute for TPE and friends but |
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> better than nothing. |
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> |
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> |
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