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Mick <michaelkintzios <at> gmail.com> writes: |
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> > Ahh, OK. So secure communications between all these clients. |
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> > The two big players for client-side encryption for email or messaging |
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> > data would be GPG and OTR; |
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|
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Good 2 know. I'll keep searching for docs. |
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|
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> Also S/MIME encryption of the email message body using SSL certificates |
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> achieves the same end result (i.e. encrypted payload) as GnuPG offers. |
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> For GPG you may need a plugin (e.g. enigmail on T'bird) or something |
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> similar for phone clients, but S/MIME is usually available by default for |
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> most email clients and platforms. |
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|
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OK, so maybe I'll test out a few devices, provide some feedback and then |
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seen about a (gentoo wiki) page. If the community is not interested in |
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that I bet these guys would put up some sort of community cook-book on |
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this topic:: [1] |
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|
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Dont know who they are, but they seem to be on the right track, |
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and they big on Gentoo! |
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|
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> A word of caution: Snowden warned us that the end devices do not ossess |
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> strong enough randomness generators to ensure that the encryption they |
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> perform cannot be reverse engineered. |
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|
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Intel has long been hiding extra hardware inside of their processors, for a |
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variety of nefarious activities. Here is a link where they now let the |
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retail world in on what has been going on for decades [2]. |
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|
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This is why the US gov keeps hyping how bad security is, so the gov can take |
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steps and the sub-contract out the details for billions (it's the new cold |
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war and we have to be scared enough to get the govs to protect us, right? |
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And all of that horse_feathers.... |
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|
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Anyone doing gate/register design/validations with Intel parts, decades ago, |
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stumbled into areas of the the intel chips with hidden hardware. Just slice |
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them and put them under any high res scanner nowadays.... Sadly, everybody |
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in the chip bidness does this routinely now. SoCs are all full |
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of this crap. |
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|
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The old AT&T phone switches (think 3B2) had this sort of 'undefined |
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hardware'. Nothing new 'signal intercept' is good to search on, but most |
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of the Intel (get the pun?) has been scrubbed form the internet on |
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'signal intercept'; particularly the Rf stuff. |
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|
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> A recent article shared on this M/L also showed that anything with Intel |
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> inside® can be deemed as intentionally weakened to enable potential |
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> interference with our privacy. |
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|
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Got that link handy? Part of the SSL v2 v3 stuff? I was hoping somebody |
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would write up a summary, and detail action plans from a gentoo |
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workstation, gentoo server and gentoo-cluster perspective on the state |
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of SSL.* issues. |
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|
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> Therefore treat your encrypted communications and their content with |
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> caution, because you don't know how private these may remain in the |
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> future. |
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|
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Kinda like a very gorgeous woman, with a low credit score (yak yak yhak)? |
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Or like an 'old bug' flying towards the light (ZAP)? |
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Certainly, but, the low rent hacks might be held at bay a little longer. |
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Still, we should make the effort to streamline and document pathways, with |
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ample warnings of cautions. |
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|
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|
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[1] https://wiki.installgentoo.com/index.php/Encryption |
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|
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[2] |
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http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/184828-intel-unveils-new-xeon-chip-with-integrated-fpga-touts-20x-performance-boost |