| 1 |
It's out of scope for file transfer protocols; it's a daemon/system-local |
| 2 |
problem. Attach pre-event or post-event scripts serverside for any special |
| 3 |
munging or protections you'd like to apply. (Such as triggering an LVM |
| 4 |
snapshot, for example...) |
| 5 |
|
| 6 |
(sorry for the top post; in-line can be done in this client, but it's more |
| 7 |
cumbersome than I have time for atm...) |
| 8 |
|
| 9 |
ZZ |
| 10 |
On Nov 14, 2011 7:45 PM, "Grant" <emailgrant@×××××.com> wrote: |
| 11 |
|
| 12 |
> >>>>> And if I pull, none of my backed-up systems are secure because anyone |
| 13 |
> >>>>> who breaks into the backup server has root read privileges on every |
| 14 |
> >>>>> backed-up system and will thereby "gain full root privileges |
| 15 |
> quickly." |
| 16 |
> >>>> |
| 17 |
> >>>> IMO that depends on whether you also backup the authentication-related |
| 18 |
> >>>> files or not. Exclude them from backup, ensure different root |
| 19 |
> passwords |
| 20 |
> >>>> for all boxes, and now you can limit the infiltration. |
| 21 |
> >>> |
| 22 |
> >>> If you're pulling to the backup server, that backup server has to be |
| 23 |
> >>> able to log in to and read all files on the other servers. Including |
| 24 |
> >>> e.g. your swap partition and device files. |
| 25 |
> >> |
| 26 |
> >> What if I have each system save a copy of everything to be backed up |
| 27 |
> >> from its own filesystem in a separate directory and change the |
| 28 |
> >> ownership of everything in that directory so it can be read by an |
| 29 |
> >> unprivileged backup user? Then I could have the backup server pull |
| 30 |
> >> that copy from each system without giving it root access to each |
| 31 |
> >> system. Can I somehow have the correct ownerships for the backup |
| 32 |
> >> saved in a separate file for use during a restore? |
| 33 |
> >> |
| 34 |
> >> - Grant |
| 35 |
> >> |
| 36 |
> > |
| 37 |
> > You could just as well use an NFS share with no_root_squash. It is |
| 38 |
> > really more a question of finding the right combination of tools to |
| 39 |
> > ensure proper separation of concern for server and client. |
| 40 |
> > |
| 41 |
> > In fact, I think we are intermixing three distinct problems: |
| 42 |
> > 1. (Possible) limitations of rdiff-backup with regard to untrusted |
| 43 |
> > backup servers or clients. |
| 44 |
> |
| 45 |
> The limitation is real unfortunately. All backups created by |
| 46 |
> rdiff-backup more than a second ago can be deleted something like |
| 47 |
> this: |
| 48 |
> |
| 49 |
> rdiff-backup --remove-older-than 1s backup@12.34.56.78::/path/to/backup |
| 50 |
> |
| 51 |
> > 2. The purely technical question which file transfer protocols protect |
| 52 |
> > against write access from backup server to backup client and backup |
| 53 |
> > client to older backups on the server. |
| 54 |
> |
| 55 |
> rdiff-backup doesn't provide those sort of protections. Do any file |
| 56 |
> transfer protocols? |
| 57 |
> |
| 58 |
> > 3. The more or less organisational question what level of protection |
| 59 |
> > backups need and how fast security breaks have to be detected. |
| 60 |
> |
| 61 |
> I think backups should be very well protected and security breaks |
| 62 |
> should not have to be immediately detected. |
| 63 |
> |
| 64 |
> - Grant |
| 65 |
> |
| 66 |
> |
| 67 |
> > I think push vs. pull is just a secondary concern with regard to the |
| 68 |
> > second question and has practically no relevance to the third one. |
| 69 |
> > |
| 70 |
> > Regards, |
| 71 |
> > Florian Philipp |
| 72 |
> |
| 73 |
> |
Archives