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On Sun, Apr 08, 2018 at 08:06:43PM -0500, Matthias Maier wrote: |
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> This is a request by two developers (and not by the council). But I |
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> would like to answer one of your questions. |
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> |
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> |
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> On Sun, Apr 8, 2018, at 19:11 CDT, zlg <zlg@g.o> wrote: |
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> |
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> > [...] |
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> > |
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> > To the Council: |
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> > |
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> > What makes you accountable to this community? Why should we trust or |
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> > respect you when you have nothing on the line except a title? What |
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> > happens next if these affirmations are made? What's your angle, your |
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> > real motivation? |
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> |
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> The Gentoo Developer community has used GLEP 39 [1] for its |
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> self-organization for the last 12 years. Our "real motivation" (speaking |
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> as individual developers) is to keep it that way. |
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That doesn't answer the question. We all know what was written in the |
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proposal. Why do you feel the Council should oversee so much despite |
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assuming no liability or responsibility? What has the Council done to |
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fix the problems in its own backyard, like recruitment, retention, |
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engagement between developers, and opportunities to grow as developers? |
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These are all existential issues that the Council routinely writes off |
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as not their problem, but still want credit for leading the |
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distribution. |
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If the affirmation is not made, what will the Council's next move be? If |
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the affirmation *is* made, what will happen? I feel as a developer I |
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deserve to know what my _elected officials_ have in mind for the future |
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and ask them questions, on a basis smaller than that of something like |
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the manifestos that we use pre-election, which are one-way |
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communication. The relationship between the elected and the electorate |
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should not be a once-a-year deal where we hand over the reins and go |
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along with everything they do. Representing people means listening to |
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their concerns and factoring them into your decisions on a regular basis. |
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This affirmation has value to the Council in some way; they would not |
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ask for it if they didn't have plans for both outcomes. I am asking the |
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Council what those plans are and why we should trust their proposal. |
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It's difficult to make this decision in isolation given the past actions |
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of the Council wrt the Foundation. I do not think it is unreasonable to |
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question the motives of the group that professes to lead and represent |
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me and other developers, thus my line of questioning. |
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|
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> |
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> |
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> > How do you trust a Council member when they have nothing to lose by |
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> > acting against the community? |
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> |
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> I fail to see how trying to get an affirmation that the Gentoo |
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> Foundation is still on board with GLEP 39 is "acting against the |
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> community". |
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I wasn't referring to any specific action in my question. It's a side |
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effect of current policy, nothing more. A bug. |
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> |
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> We have had a very public case of prometheanfire pushing for dissolving |
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> the current metastructure and reorganizing the community under the |
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> Foundation. Andreas and I, personally, disagree with that. |
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Why should a group -- who holds no legal, social, or practical |
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responsibility -- be trusted to lead the efforts of an organization? The |
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Council is not held to GLEPs or the CoC nearly as strongly as the |
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Foundation is to its Bylaws (and by extension, the CoC), and a large |
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part of that is the list of obligations outlined in the Articles of |
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Incorporation. |
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No such legal document exists to hold the Council accountable for |
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anything. I am asking: in the absence of that, how can we trust you |
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guys? |
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Those who take on the most liability should have the most weight in |
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decision-making. That attitude is common among Gentoo developers, too; |
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the people who'd end up doing the work behind a decision (i.e. the ones |
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responsible for carrying it out) have the most influence. Why should our |
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leadership be any different when it comes to accountability? |
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Sacrificing a few hours a month to chit-chat about some technical |
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decisions doesn't really convince me that you're accountable to us or |
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that you care about the effects of your decisions. |
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A Trustee can be sued or legally removed from the project if found in |
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violation of Bylaws. What consequences does a Council member face beyond |
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removal from a mail alias and a few other minor things? |
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That is the crux of my position. Your proposal seeks to maintain that |
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the Council assumes all admin powers, while the Foundation maintains all |
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liability and accountability, with an implicit expectation of supporting |
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the Council. Why should the Foundation be held responsible for the |
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Council's decisions? The Council doesn't respect the vulnerability of |
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the Trustees or the practical power that the Foundation has. The current |
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structure is not equitable. At present, five people at Gentoo put their |
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names and reputations on the line for this distro while a group of seven |
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people do whatever they please and offer nothing in return for the |
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privilege. Why should Council members be held to a lower standard than a |
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Trustee? |
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I hope I am not alone in seeing this imbalance in liability versus |
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influence. |
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> |
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> Best, Matthias |
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> |
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> [1] https://www.gentoo.org/glep/glep-0039.html |
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